November 29, 2018, marks the 71st anniversary of Resolution 181, the UN General Assembly Resolution that laid out plans for the partitioning of Palestine, then under British occupation rule, into two independent states. This historic resolution is largely considered to be the first domino in the decades of resulting clashes between the eventual Israeli state and the native Palestinian and surrounding Arab peoples.
But few are aware of the events or conditions leading up to the vote, the influences behind the vote, or why it was not accepted by all of the parties involved. There are many facts surrounding these early post-World War II years as well as those facts on the ground in Palestine that are both useful and essential to understanding not only the events of late 1947 and 1948 but set the stage for conflict in the years to come. So, in the spirit of equipping you with knowledge, here are five important facts that you need to know about Resolution 181.
It Had No Actual Legal Power
In the years leading up to 1947, the British, who then occupied and managed Palestine, were coming under tremendous pressure. Many militant Zionists felt that the British favored the native Palestinians in policy and preference and, especially during the migrant crises surrounding Jewish persecution and the Holocaust, Jewish immigration was still limited into the region. Along with their decision to leave India, the British decided to pull out of Palestine as well and in February of
That body did, after many months of deliberation, pass a partition resolution plan. But while many point to this resolution as a legal mechanism undergirding the creation of a Jewish state, we must remember that UN General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding on their member states. Indeed, in the resolution language itself, it called on the Security Council to take necessary measures to carry out the plan, which the body never took up. As well, though referred by Britain for consideration, many legal jurists, like Henry Cattan, have noted that “The UN possessed no sovereignty over Palestine, nor the power to deprive the people of Palestine of their right of independence. Hence, the UN resolution for the partition of Palestine possesses no value, in law or in fact” The UN also avoided requests to have the matter of UN jurisdiction considered by international courts and, as Cattan suggests, “Such avoidance of international law constituted a denial of justice which deprived the partition resolution of any juridical value.”
We should take a moment to note the inherent problems with the idea that the United Nations should or even justly could propose such a thing. The idea that a group of appointed representatives (not even elected, of which both ideas are still found wanting in terms of legitimacy) would legitimately devise a plan that would divide up a tract of land that none of them have any moral or ethical claim to, impacting hundreds of thousands of lives along with their associated property rights, strains any sense of credulity. To those of a libertarian
It Also Called for a Palestinian State
While much of the dialogue around the United Nations resolution for the partition of Palestine focuses on the creation and borders of a Jewish state, it can sometimes be lost in the discussion that the resolution also, naturally, included borders for a Palestinian or “Arab” state. As is noted in more detail in the next section, the land reserved for the Palestinian state did not reflect the realities on the ground. And within the next year, much of the land originally marked for that state was claimed or occupied by Israeli forces. It was apparently hoped that the two states, around an international Jerusalem, would form a sort of economic union. But since the members of the UNSCOP, the special committee appointed by the UN to investigate and draft the resolution
This point is a small but still important one. In so much as one might invoke the power or force of a United Nations resolution to legitimize or vindicate the existence of the Jewish/Israeli state, one must equally recognize that same legitimization for a Palestinian one.
It was Rather One-Sided
If you have followed some of our other posts concerning Zionism, you may be familiar with the overall series of events leading up to the mass migration of Zionist Jews to Palestine. A series of
That changed quite a bit with the oppression brought about by fascism and Naziism in Germany and Eastern Europe. With the advent of far greater numbers of Jewish refugees fleeing Europe, Zionists increased international pressure to cement a more formal (and externally supported and enforced) agreement for a Jewish state and future immigration.
But despite these pressures, Jewish immigration to Palestine had not been friendly to any potential partition plan. Much of the Jewish immigration thus far to Palestine consisted of urban intellectuals, which makes sense considering many from Russia, for instance, were socialists and communists of the Bolshevik persuasion. As such, Jewish presence was centered in urban areas, leaving the rural and farmland areas with a vast Palestinian majority; Pappe estimates that only 5.8% of the cultivated land was in Jewish ownership as of 1947. Many of the Jewish settlements that were located in more rural areas were surrounded by non-Jewish inhabitants and, over time, had become to resemble highly secluded, walled off, militant colonies.
So it is no surprise that partitioning such a landscape in a fashion with contiguous areas of land in a way resembling any sort of logical, just, or workable way was difficult if not impossible. In light of such difficulties, the resulting partition plan appears naive and very one-sided. As Pappe summarizes, “the Jews, who owned less than six
One need only to look at the proposed borders to understand the utter indefensibility of either state. In light of the decades of previous clashes between the Jews, Palestinians, and Bedouins, the stage was obviously set for further violence and, as would eventually occur, ethnic cleansing of state areas.
It Involved Dirty Politics
As the facts on the ground in Palestine were diverse, so was the state of affairs within the UN General Assembly. In order for the partition resolution to pass, it required a two-thirds majority. Early on, this majority was simply not present. Many who hold a globalist or internationalist idea of the United Nations may very well view the body as a sort of unbiased representation of the international populace. But international politics is often just as dirty as domestic politics. And when it was clear that the resolution did not yet have the support it required, politically connected Zionists and those that supported them went on the offensive, delaying the vote to afford them time and opportunity to sway the body and its underlying countries in support of the measure.
One of the primary levers pulled to manipulate votes in the General Assembly was foreign aid. Bernard Baruch, a familiar name for those who have studied the history of the New Deal, used the threat of ending U.S. aid to influence France to support the resolution. Zionists, such as those of the Jewish Agency, “used any tools at hand” and left out “…not the smallest or remotest of nations” in threatening to use their influence to end foreign aid if they refused their support. And crony corporations were not off limits either. Harvey Firestone, of tire/rubber notoriety, under pressure from the White House, threatened to curtail his planned expansion in Liberia if they withheld support. Not surprisingly, Liberia eventually voted yes.
Latin American countries received bribes, threats, gifts, even a blank checkbook in the case of Costa Rica, in exchange for their support. The Phillipino delegate, who previously delivered a passionate speech on the UN floor opposing partition on human rights grounds, after being threatened by US Supreme Court justice Felix Frankfurter, quickly did an about face and voted for the resolution. These examples surely only scratch the surface of the myriad ways in which carrots and sticks were used to influence member nations away from voting their principles.
It Was Highly Unpopular Among US Officials
It is illustrative enough to detail
The US president at the time was Harry Truman who was still serving as president following the death of Franklin Roosevelt. Those familiar with Truman’s early presidential life will recall that he lacked much of his own perspective on presidential matters prior to becoming president and depended heavily on those around him, especially regarding foreign policy. But despite this, Truman was originally skeptical of supporting the Zionist cause for a national home in Palestine. And when the UN began to consider and debate plans for partition, the U.S. State Department shared this same skepticism and was firmly against the plan.
Loy Henderson, then director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs considered the creation of a Jewish state to “…go against locals’ wishes, imperil U.S. interests and violate democratic principles.” As well, he considered: “At the present time the United States has a moral prestige in the Near and Middle East unequaled by that of any other great power. We would lose that prestige and would be likely for many years to be considered as a betrayer of the high principles which we ourselves have enunciated during the period of the [second world] war.” It is difficult today for many Americans to grasp a time in which the United States held any such prestige in the Middle East and it is equally as simple to see how his predictions have come true in the ensuing decades. In exchange for his thoughts, he was called an anti-Semite, his family threatened, and Zionist pressure was eventually enough to have him transferred to Nepal, far from any possible influence in the Middle East.
But Henderson was not alone. The CIA warned that Zionist aims were antithetical to strategic interests in the region. Henry F. Grady, a highly respected ambassador during the Cold War, echoed other’s opinions that siding with the Zionist cause endangered Arab relations which were advantageous against the Soviets. Dean Acheson opposed Zionism, warning that the creation of a Jewish state and greatly increased immigration into the region “would vastly exacerbate the political problem and imperil not only American but all Western interests in the Near East.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued numerous papers warning that the Zionist cause would continually use America as a tool to further their own aims. And Gordon Merriam, head of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs offered what should be obvious reasons to object to the plan, namely that “U.S. support for
Unfortunately, this pressure was not enough to discourage Truman from his support of Zionism. Truman, along with his political advisors, such as Clark Clifford, saw the Jewish vote in America as too precious and necessary for the upcoming presidential election.
The Bottom Line
In the months of violence that ensued after the UN decision, the international reaction was one of backpedaling. The Chinese ambassador of the time tragically noted, “The United Nations was created mainly for the maintenance of international peace. It would be tragic indeed if the United Nations, by attempting a political settlement, should be the cause of war.” In the decades that followed, it is clear that the UN’s political settlement certainly helped in doing just that. There are other noteworthy facts worthy of consideration around Resolution 181 that I hope to cover in the future. But for now, let us settle for these reminders of how good intentions in politics almost never translate to good outcomes.